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3.1 Introduction
In all societies, intergenerational transfers are large and potentially have
an important inﬂuence on inequality and economic growth. The develop-
ment of each generation of youth depends on the resources that it receives
from productive members of society for health, education, and sustenance.
The well-being of the elderly depends on social programs that provide
health care and income support and also on familial systems that dominate
in many developing countries.
The importance of intergenerational transfers has not gone unnoticed
by the research community. During the last two decades there have been
important advances in measuring, modeling, and assessing the implica-
tions of intergenerational transfers at both the micro and the macro level.
Andrew Mason is a professor of economics at the University of Hawaii at Manoa and a
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Andrew Mason, Ronald Lee, An-Chi Tung, 
Mun-Sim Lai, and Tim MillerA comprehensive macro-level intergenerational transfer framework and
accounting system, however, has not been developed. In particular, eﬀorts
to model and measure familial transfers at the aggregate level have lagged.
One purpose of this chapter is to outline key concepts and methods be-
ing used to construct National Transfer Accounts (NTAs), an accounting
system for measuring intergenerational transfers at the aggregate level in a
manner consistent with National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).
National Transfer Accounts provide estimates of economic ﬂows across
age groups that arise primarily because children and the elderly consume
more than they produce, relying on reallocations from the working ages.
(See Lee, Lee, and Mason 2008 for a more detailed analysis of the eco-
nomic life cycle.) These ﬂows can be cross-sectional—a transfer from par-
ents to children, for example. Or the ﬂows can be longitudinal—for ex-
ample, accumulation of wealth during the working years and its
disaccumulation during retirement. For want of a better term, we refer to
these ﬂows as “reallocations.” When complete, NTA accounts will distin-
guish three forms of these ﬂows: as the accumulation of capital, as trans-
fers, and as credit transactions. Here we consider only two: transfers and
asset transactions, combining capital and credit transactions. The ac-
counts distinguish the institutions that mediate the transactions: govern-
ments, markets, and families. When complete, NTA accounts will provide
estimates with suﬃcient historical depth to study the evolution of inter-
generational transfer systems; the consequences of alternative approaches
to age reallocations embodied in public policy with respect to pensions,
health care, education, and social institutions (e.g., the extended family);
and the social, political, and economic implications of population aging.
A second purpose of this chapter is to compare the life cycles and sup-
port systems of Taiwan and the United States. The diﬀerences between
these two countries are particularly interesting because of the relative im-
portance of their familial support systems—strong in Taiwan and weak in
the United States. In the United States, private interhousehold transfers
are small and, because few elderly live with their adult children, intra-
household transfers are small, as well. In Taiwan, private interhousehold
transfers are more important and, because many elderly live with their
adult children, intrahousehold transfers are substantial. As a general
proposition this is well known. The contribution here is to provide esti-
mates of the economic ﬂows that allow direct comparison of alternative
forms of support. Our conclusion is that familial transfers from nonelderly
adults to those sixty-ﬁve and older are large in Taiwan—exceeding U.S.
public transfers measured as a percentage of consumption by those sixty-
ﬁve and older.
There are other features of the reallocation systems in the United States
and Taiwan that are explored. We show that income from assets is a very
important source of income for the elderly in both countries, but particu-
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ing rates in the United States and the relatively high saving rates in Taiwan.
Asset income does play an important direct role in old-age support in Tai-
wan, but it also plays an indirect role by ﬁnancing transfers from middle-
aged adults to elderly parents.
The support systems for children are very similar in the United States
and Taiwan. Almost all of the ﬁnancial resources available to those under
the age of twenty consist of transfers. In the United States, about 60 per-
cent and in Taiwan about 75 percent of all transfers to children are famil-
ial transfers. The remainder consists largely of public transfers, of which
support for public education is particularly important.
3.2 Background
Research on intergenerational transfers has laid a solid foundation for
constructing the NTA system with the historical depth and cross-national
perspective envisioned here. Following on the pioneering work of Samuel-
son (1958) and Willis (1988), a theoretical transfer framework has been de-
veloped by Lee and his collaborators (Lee 1994a; Lee 1994b; Bommier and
Lee 2003). The Lee transfer framework has been applied to many diﬀerent
settings, but often under a restrictive set of assumptions (steady-state equi-
librium and golden-rule growth). At the same time, generational account-
ing has been used to describe forward-looking public longitudinal data in
various countries (Auerbach, Gokhale and Kotlikoﬀ1991; Auerbach, Kot-
likoﬀ and Leibfritz 1999).
Progress in modeling private and familial transfers at the aggregate level
has been sporadic, but there have been important advances. The increased
availability of surveys and micro-level studies has greatly improved our abil-
ity to measure familial transfers and to study why they occur (Lillard and
Willis 1997; McGarry and Schoeni 1997; Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoﬀ
2000; Frankenberg, Lillard, and Willis 2002). Progress has been made in es-
timating and modeling bequests (Attanasio and Hoynes 2000; Poterba
2000; Poterba and Weisbenner 2001; Brown and Weisbenner 2002). There
have been important advances in modeling the allocation of resources
within households, a step critical to estimating intrahousehold intergenera-
tional transfers (Lazear and Michael 1988; Bourguignon and Chiappori
1992; Deaton 1997; Bourguignon 1999). Innovative surveys provide new
opportunities for analyzing intergenerational transfers (Chu 2000; Herma-
lin 2002). Building on the available theoretical framework and the extensive
research on familial transfers, and utilizing the extensive household survey
data that are available in many countries makes estimating familial inter-
generational transfers and a complete set of National Transfer Accounts a
feasible option.
Constructing estimates of familial transfers is important because they
Population Aging and Intergenerational Transfers 91play such a key role around the world. Familial transfers are almost uni-
versally the primary source of resources for children. Familial transfers to
the elderly can have a profound eﬀect on intergenerational equity (Mason
and Miller 2000). Outside the industrialized countries of the West, most
elderly coreside with their adult children. In Japan and South Korea, the
extent of coresidence has declined very rapidly in the last few decades, but
roughly half of the elderly still live with children. In other Asian countries,
the great majority of the elderly live with their children, and there is a sur-
prising degree of stability in these arrangements. The situation in Latin
America is less thoroughly documented, but data for six Latin American
countries show that living in multigeneration households has been the
norm there as well (Kinsella 1990).
Extended-living arrangements are less important in the West, but in
some European countries the elderly are not living exclusively by them-
selves nor with their spouse. In Greece and Spain roughly 40 percent of
those sixty-ﬁve and older were living in households with three or more per-
sons in the early 1990s. At the other extreme, only about 5 percent of the
elderly of Sweden and Denmark lived in households with two or more per-
sons. France is in an intermediate position, with 16 percent of the elderly
living in households with two or more persons (Kinsella and Velkoﬀ2001).
In the United States, the great majority of elderly do not live with their chil-
dren, but this has not always been the case. The percentage of sixty-ﬁve and
older living with children in the United States declined from 64 percent in
1880 to 49 percent in 1940, 30 percent in 1960, and 18 percent in 1980
(Ruggles 1994).
A more comprehensive approach to intergenerational transfers is criti-
cal to resolving many important issues. The system of intergenerational
transfers bears directly on current research on the demographic dividend.
Increases in the share of the working-age population, particularly in East
Asia, have contributed to rapid growth in per capita income (Kelley and
Schmidt 1995; Bloom and Williamson 1998; Kelley and Schmidt 2001;
Mason 2001; Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2002). The demographic divi-
dend may dissipate, however, as the share of the elderly population rises
and the share of the working-age population declines. If capital accumula-
tion rather than familial or public transfer programs dominates the age re-
allocation systems for supporting the elderly, population aging may yield a
second demographic dividend in the form of higher rates of saving and cap-
ital intensiﬁcation of the economy (Mason 2005; Mason and Lee 2006). If
aging is accompanied by a shift away from transfer systems, either public
or private, the eﬀects on capital accumulation may be especially pro-
nounced (Lee, Mason, and Miller 2003).
A second area of research concerns an important factual issue—
whether there are substantial generational inequities and whether they are
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proach models intergenerational transfers as the outcome of political pro-
cesses in which the magnitude and direction of transfers reﬂect the politi-
cal power of the elderly relative to other demographic groups (Preston
1984; Razin, Sadka, and Swagel 2002). An alternative approach argues
that intergenerational transfers are the outcome of cooperative private and
social implicit contracts that are guided by altruism and eﬃciency con-
cerns (Barro 1974; Becker and Tomes 1976; Becker and Murphy 1988).
A third area of research addresses the eﬀects of intergenerational trans-
fers on saving, economic growth, and equity (Feldstein 1974; Munnell
1974; Feldstein 1996; Gale 1998). These and similar studies inform eﬀorts
to evaluate existing transfer systems, to guide the development of new sys-
tems, and to anticipate the implications of alternative reform proposals.
Social security reform, in particular, has been the subject of an enormous
amount of research (Feldstein 1998; Feldstein and Samwick 2001; Krueger
and Kubler 2002; Diamond 2006).
Operating in the background and providing the impetus for research
and reform eﬀorts is population aging. Low levels of fertility and contin-
ued improvements in life expectancy in many countries are leading to rapid
population aging. The advanced industrialized countries—Japan, Euro-
pean countries, and the United States—are further along in the aging pro-
cess. Many less developed countries, however, will soon have much older
populations. Three aspects of population aging in the developing world are
noteworthy. First, many countries are likely to experience population ag-
ing at a relatively low level of development. Not only will they have rela-
tively low levels of income, but they may also have relatively underdevel-
oped political and ﬁnancial institutions that are playing a prominent role
in aging industrial societies. Second, familial support systems are more im-
portant in many developing societies than in the West. Third, we have
found that population aging causes a large increase in the demand for life-
cycle wealth relative to GDP. Population aging interacts with the transfer
systems either to generate a major increase in the proportional implicit
debt and transfer burden on the working population, or to generate a large
deepening of the capital stock. Third World countries are at a crucial junc-
ture, and depending on their policy choices, population aging will have one
or the other eﬀect. Hence, understanding how familial support systems op-
erate, how they interact with alternative transfer systems, and how they are
aﬀected by population aging is critical.
3.2.1 National Transfer Accounts: An Overview
The purpose of National Transfer Accounts is to measure at the aggre-
gate level the reallocations, across age, of economic resources. These real-
locations occur because at some ages, individuals consume more than they
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reallocation system documents the means by which the young and the
old—those with lifecycle deﬁcits—draw on the surplus resources gener-
ated during the prime working ages.
Age proﬁles of consumption, production, and reallocations are viewed
from an individual, rather than a household, perspective. In economies
where formal sector employment dominates, measuring production (or
earnings) for individuals is a relatively straightforward task. In traditional
settings, where employment is informal and production is often organized
within a family enterprise, estimating production by age for individuals is
diﬃcult. In any setting, allocating consumption to individuals is challeng-
ing, because most expenditure data are collected for households rather
than individuals. Moreover, some goods are jointly consumed or involve
increasing returns to scale, so that allocating consumption to individuals
inevitably involves arbitrary rules.
From the household perspective, production and consumption are attri-
butes of households, varying with age of the household head. Construct-
ing production and consumption proﬁles is more straightforward, but
there are tradeoﬀs involved. The ﬁrst is that the eﬀects of coresident chil-
dren and elderly on household consumption and production proﬁles must
be explicitly modeled or—as is often the case—neglected altogether. In-
deed, a large share of all societal income redistribution occurs within house-
holds, and would therefore be invisible to accounting on a household basis.
The second is the diﬃculty of translating changes in population-age struc-
ture into changes in the age structure of household heads and household
membership.
Age reallocations are substantial relative to the economy. Consider the
situation in Taiwan as represented in ﬁgure 3.1, panel A, which shows esti-
mates of aggregate consumption and labor income by age in 1998. Total net
reallocations to those twenty-three and younger, the young age group for
which consumption exceeded labor income, amounted to 35 percent of to-
tal labor income. Total net reallocations to those who were ﬁfty-seven or
older, the old age group for which consumption exceeded labor income,
amounted to 9 percent of total labor income. Thus, nearly half of all labor
income was reallocated from the surplus ages to the dependent ages.2
The age proﬁles of aggregate consumption and labor income reﬂect the
age distribution of the population (ﬁg. 3.1, panel B), and per capita varia-
tion in labor income and consumption (ﬁg. 3.1, panel C). In 1998, Taiwan’s
population was younger than the United States population. Thirty-one
percent were under the age of twenty and 8 percent were sixty-ﬁve or older.
Hence, the reallocations reﬂect that age structure—with more going to
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1. Detailed methodology and other information can be found at www.ntaccounts.org.
2. Calculation details are discussed in the following.children and less going to seniors than in the United States. As will be seen
in the following, Taiwan also has per capita proﬁles that are distinctive as
compared with the United States. Taiwan’s consumption proﬁle is very ﬂat
and its labor income reaches a peak at a relatively young age as compared
with the United States.
Reallocation systems, which bridge the gaps between consumption and
labor income, vary along two important dimensions: the governing or me-
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A
B
Fig. 3.1 A, Aggregate consumption and labor income, Taiwan, 1998, nominal val-
ues; B, Population, Taiwan, 1998; C, Per capita consumption and labor income, Tai-
wan, 1998diating institution and the economic form of the reallocation (Lee 1994a;
1994b). The public sector reallocates resources relying on social mandates
embodied in law and regulation and implemented by local, regional, and
national governments. Education, public pensions, and health care pro-
grams are important examples of public reallocation programs. Private-
sector reallocations are governed by voluntary contracts, social conven-
tions, and so on, that are mediated by households, families, charitable
organizations, and other private institutions. Important examples of
private reallocations are private saving and credit transactions and famil-
ial support to children and the elderly (table 3.1).
In this chapter we distinguish two economic forms that reallocations can
take: asset-based reallocations and transfers.
Asset-based reallocations: Assets include capital, property, and credit.
From the perspective of the individual (or household), these forms are
close substitutes as reallocation mechanisms. They can be accumulated
and disaccumulated. They yield income. They are used primarily to re-
allocate resources from the present to the future. From the perspective
of the macro-economy, however, there are important diﬀerences be-
tween capital, property, and credit.
Capital-based reallocations: Transactions that increase future consump-
tion by foregoing current consumption. They lead to a change in the
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Fig. 3.1 (cont.) A, Aggregate consumption and labor income, Taiwan, 1998, nomi-
nal values; B, Population, Taiwan, 1998; C, Per capita consumption and labor in-
come, Taiwan, 1998
Cstock of reproducible capital, including inventories. Only reallocations
from younger ages to older ages are possible. Individuals can accumu-
late capital when young and dispose of it when old.
Property-based reallocations: Transactions that involve the trade of a
nonreproducible asset; for example, land. They yield no change in ag-
gregate wealth. Property acquired in one period can yield rental income
in future periods or can be sold in future periods to ﬁnance consumption
at older ages. At any point in time, property-based reallocations net to
zero for all age groups combined. The purchase or rental of property
produces an inﬂow for one individual that is matched by an outﬂow for
another individual.
Credit-based reallocations: Intertemporal transactions based solely on a
contractual obligation to trade economic resources in one period in re-
turn for compensation in one or more future periods. In a closed econ-
omy, credit-based reallocations do not lead to a change in aggregate
wealth, because an increase in the wealth of one group is always bal-
anced by the decline in wealth of another age group. The use of credit
cards to ﬁnance consumption by individuals and the use of domestically
held public debt, including the printing of money, to ﬁnance government
programs are examples. Credit transactions can be used to reallocate re-
sources in either direction.
Transfers: Reallocations from one group to another that involve no ex-
plicit quid pro quo.3 Transfers can ﬂow in either direction—from older
to younger (parents and taxpayers to children) or from younger to older
(adult children and taxpayers to the elderly).
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Table 3.1 A classiﬁcation of National Transfer Account reallocations.
Asset-based reallocations
Capital and property Credit Transfers
Public Public infrastructure Public debt Public education
Student loan programs Public health care
Money Unfunded pension plans
Private Housing Consumer credit Familial support of children 




Source: Adapted from Lee 1994a.
3. Of course, important models of familial transfers emphasize implicit contracts; for
example, risk sharing (Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak 1981) or the exchange of money for time (Cox
1987).The core of the NTA system consists of two accounts: the ﬂow account and
the wealth account. The ﬂow account measures inﬂows and outﬂows be-
tween age groups that occur during the accounting period in question. The
wealth account measures the value of the stock associated with each ﬂow.
This chapter emphasizes the ﬂow account, and the wealth account is not
discussed further.
3.2.2 The National Transfer Flow Account
The National Transfer Flow Account measures inter-age ﬂows for a pre-
scribed accounting period, typically a calendar or ﬁscal year. The NT Flow
Account is governed by an accounting identity, which must be satisﬁed for
any individual, household, age group, or economy, stating that for any pe-
riod inﬂows are balanced by outﬂows.
(1) Y L   Y K   Y M    g
     f
    C   IK   IM    g
     f
 .
Inﬂows consist of labor income (YL), the returns to capital (Y K) and land
and credit (Y M), and transfer inﬂows from the public sector ( g
 ) and the
private sector ( f
 ). Outﬂows consist of consumption (C), investment in
capital (IK) or credit and land (IM), and transfer outﬂows to the government
( –
g) and the private sector ( f
–). In this chapter, we do not distinguish capi-
tal from land and credit. Designating asset income by Y A, assets by A   K
  M and saving by S   IK   IM, substituting into equation (1) and re-
arranging terms provides the key elements of the NT Flow Account. The
diﬀerence between consumption and production, termed the lifecycle deﬁ-
cit, must be matched by age reallocations, consisting of asset-based reallo-
cations and net transfers:
(2)
Transfers are further subdivided into net public transfers and net private
transfers, consisting of bequests and inter vivos transfers.
The National Transfer Flow Account for Taiwan in 1998 is shown in
summary form as table 3.2, to provide a concrete point of reference for
further discussion. The totals in the table are based on National Income
and Product Account values and thereby ensure consistency with NIPA.
Brieﬂy, consumption is equal to total ﬁnal consumption expenditure.4
CY Y S LA −= −
Life-cycle deficit Asset-based re eallocations Net public transfer
+−
+−    gg
s s Net private transfers
Net tr
+−
+−    jf
a ansfers
Age reallocations
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4. Private ﬁnal consumption is adjusted to exclude indirect taxes that are assumed to be
paid indirectly by consumers. In other words, the value of ﬁnal consumption is calculated us-
ing basic prices that exclude indirect taxes.Private and public consumption correspond to private ﬁnal consumption
expenditure and government ﬁnal consumption expenditure. Labor in-
come has no exact NIPA counterpart, because the income of unincorpo-
rated ﬁrms includes returns to labor and to capital. We allocate two-thirds
of this income to labor and one-third to capital, to obtain estimates of la-
bor income and income on assets. Saving is deﬁned as national saving net
of depreciation. In a closed economy, net transfers and each of its compo-
nents would sum to zero. In an open economy, international ﬁnancial ﬂows
lead to net transfer totals that diﬀer from zero. In Taiwan, for example,
private transfers to abroad exceeded those received from abroad by NT$31
billion. More detailed information about adjustments is available from the
authors.
All aggregates are allocated across age using methods that are brieﬂy de-
scribed in the following. The values are cumulated into broad age groups
to facilitate presentation and discussion, but the underlying values were es-
timated by single-year of age, with an upper age group of ninety plus, as
shown in ﬁgure 3.1.
The upper panel of the NT Flow Account (Table 3.2) reports the life-
cycle deﬁcits, the gaps between labor production and consumption. The
lower panel reports the age reallocations and their components. As shown
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Table 3.2 National Transfer Flow Account, Taiwan, 1998, aggregate values,
nominal, (NT$ billion)
Domestic by age
Total 0–19 20–29 30–49 50–64 65 
Lifecycle deﬁcit 525 1,671 –13 –1,500 –25 391
Consumption 5,855 1,737 1,064 1,939 654 461
Public 1,549 590 246 419 161 133
Private 4,305 1,147 818 1,520 493 328
Less: Labor income 5,330 66 1,076 3,439 678 70
Age reallocations 525 1,671 –13 –1,500 –25 391
Asset-based reallocations 554 –21 –213 362 266 160
Public –173 1 19 –103 –63 –27
Income on assets 0 0 –1 –5 3 4
Less: Public saving 173 –1 –20 97 66 31
Private 727 –22 –232 464 329 187
Income on assets 2,149 4 182 1,265 490 208
Less: Private saving 1,422 26 413 800 161 21
Transfers –29 1,692 200 –1,862 –290 231
Public 2 436 –15 –463 –77 121
Private –31 1,256 215 –1,399 –213 111
Inter vivos transfers –31 1,256 146 –1,489 –130 186
Bequests 0 0 69 90 –84 –75in the budget identity, equation (2), the lifecycle deﬁcits and reallocations
must be equal, in total and for each age group.
Life-Cycle Deﬁcit
The life-cycle deﬁcit is large and positive for children and the elderly,
close to zero for young adults and those aged ﬁfty to sixty-four, and large
and negative only for adults aged thirty to forty-nine. Taiwan’s life-cycle
deﬁcit for children was NT$1.7 trillion, 96 percent of their total consump-
tion, and the life-cycle deﬁcit for the elderly was NT$0.4 trillion, 85 percent
of their total consumption. Thirty- to forty-nine-year-olds had a life-cycle
surplus of $NT1.5 trillion. That those aged thirty to forty-nine had a large
life-cycle surplus and that those aged ﬁfty to sixty-four did not runs con-
trary to the conventional wisdom about the economic lifecycle; that ﬁfty to
sixty-four are ages conducive to high rates of saving. Note that the surplus
was less than the total life-cycle deﬁcit of the dependent age groups, lead-
ing to an overall deﬁcit of NT$525 billion or 9 percent of total consump-
tion. If the economy were on a golden rule steady-state growth path, the to-
tal life-cycle deﬁcit would have been zero. A positive total life-cycle deﬁcit
occurs when consumption exceeds total labor income.5
The life-cycle deﬁcit is a residual—calculated as the diﬀerence between
consumption and labor income. All consumption—both public and
private—is included in the NT Flow Account and all is allocated to indi-
viduals. Private consumption includes the rental value of owner-occupied
housing. Public consumption includes goods and services that are con-
sumed directly by individuals; for example, health care and education.
Public consumption also includes the value of all other government con-
sumption, such as spending on public safety, foreign diplomacy, public in-
frastructure, and so on.
All consumption is allocated to individuals based on their age, using al-
location rules that vary with the type of good being allocated and the avail-
ability of data. Consider, ﬁrst, public programs. The consumption of public
education is allocated to students using age- and education-level-speciﬁc
enrollment rates, assuming that the cost per student varies across educa-
tion level (primary, secondary, tertiary) but does not vary by age within
the educational level. Age proﬁles of publicly provided or ﬁnanced health
care in the United States (Medicare, Medicaid, and other public programs)
are based on age estimates of the U.S. National Health Accounts for 1999
(Keehan et al. 2004). Control totals for these programs are taken from 
U.S. National Income and Product Account (NIPA) tables for 2000.6 In
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5. Dynamically eﬃcient economies will have zero or positive total lifecycle deﬁcits.
6. http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/dn/nipaweb/index.asp. In Taiwan, public consumption of
health is very small. A National Health Insurance program has been instituted that provides
partial reimbursement of the cost of services of private health providers. This is classiﬁed as
private health expenditure.Taiwan, the shape of the age proﬁle of consumption ﬁnanced through Na-
tional Health Insurance (NHI) is estimated using the variable “beneﬁt in-
come of NHI” reported in the Survey of Family Income and Expenditure
(FIES). The aggregate control total is reported in Health Trends and Vital
Statistics Taiwan (Department of Health, 1998). In the United States, the
value of food stamps and public housing are assigned to members of
households who report receipt of these beneﬁts on the basis of equivalence
scales. All other public consumption is allocated on a per capita basis.
Private consumption is estimated using household surveys that report
the number and age of household members and total household consump-
tion, but not the consumption of individual members. Allocation rules are
used to distribute consumption to each household member. Per capita age
proﬁles of consumption are then computed by averaging across the con-
sumption estimates for all individuals of a given age in the survey.7
Age proﬁles of labor income are based on individual-level data on com-
pensation and entrepreneurial income. We assume that two-thirds of entre-
preneurial income is a return to labor and one-third is a return to capital.
Asset-Based Reallocations
Two broad economic forms by which resources are reallocated across
age groups are presented in the lower panel of the NT Flow Account: as-
set-based reallocations and net transfers. Asset-based reallocation is the
response to life-cycle problems captured in the classic life-cycle saving
model. Suppose individuals relied exclusively on life-cycle saving to reallo-
cate resources from the working years to old age. Sometime during the
working years, individuals would begin to save. This would generate a net
outﬂow in the NT Flow Account. As the individual accumulates assets, he
or she would begin to receive asset income, an inﬂow. The net inﬂow from
asset-based reallocations is measured by asset income less saving (Y A – S).
For a classic life-cycle saver, net asset-based reallocations would be nega-
tive during life-cycle surplus years. In his or her retirement years, the life-
cycle saver generates inﬂows—positive net asset-based reallocations—
suﬃcient to cover the life-cycle deﬁcit. To do so the individual would rely
on asset income (Y A) and dissaving (S   0).8
The NTA framework does not assume that individuals behave as life-
cycle consumers, and other forms of behavior are captured by asset-based
reallocations. For example, if young individuals go into debt to ﬁnance their
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7. We have experimented with various methods for estimating the equivalence scales. We
have found the Engels’ and Rothbarth’s methods to yield problematic results. At present, we
ﬁrst use regression methods to allocate expenditures on education and health care by age
within households, and then allocate the remainder of household expenditures using equiva-
lence scales. The equivalence scale is 0.4 for children under age ﬁve, increasing linearly from
0.5 at age ﬁve to 1.0 at age twenty, remaining constant for those older than twenty. See Deaton
(1997) for a detailed discussion of allocation rules.
8. A pure lifecycle saver may not dis-save in the initial years of retirement.education, this would be reﬂected as a positive asset-based reallocation dur-
ing school years—as individuals incurred debt beyond necessary debt re-
payment—and as a negative asset-based reallocation later in life, as ex-
students repaid their student loans. Alternatively, parents might accumulate
assets in anticipation of the high costs of college. This would be reﬂected as
negative asset-based reallocations for parents with precollege-age children
and positive asset-based reallocations for parents with college-age children.
If asset accumulation is driven by a bequest motive, we would see negative
asset-based reallocations during working years and positive reallocations at
the time of death.
Although the role of assets as a reallocation tool is most easily explained
by describing the behavior of an individual or a cohort over time, the NT
Flow Account reports the ﬂows for a particular year for a cross-section of
age groups. Asset-based reallocations at all ages may respond to short-
term economic ﬂuctuations. The asset income and disaccumulation of
capital at older ages is not tied in any direct way to the accumulation at
younger ages, as observed in the cross-section.
Assets are not assigned to individual members of the household. Rather,
we assume that all assets are held by a single individual—the household
head. Thus, results presented here are consistent with other analyses that
report assets or saving by the age of the head. The results also suﬀer from
the same diﬃculties of interpretation, particularly in societies where multi-
generation extended households are common. The inﬂuence on our results
of gender bias in the choice of head will depend on the age diﬀerence be-
tween husbands and wives. The mean age of age proﬁles tied to the age of
the head will be greater if husbands are older than wives and more likely to
be chosen as the head of the household.
In Taiwan, estimates of age proﬁles of net asset income are based on
household-level data on entrepreneurial income, dividends, rent, and inter-
est income and expense. For the United States, estimates are based on age
proﬁles of net worth. In both countries, saving is estimated as a residual.
Transfers
The second form of reallocations is transfers. A transfer, as measured by
the NTA system, is a transaction that transfers a good, service, or cash
from an individual belonging to one age group to an individual belonging
to another age group with no expectation of compensation or an explicit
quid pro quo in any form. Transfers received are called inﬂows [  (a)],
transfer payments are called outﬂows [ –(a)], and net transfers are the
diﬀerence between the two [ (a)     (a) –  –(a)]. Public transfers [ g(a)] are
mediated by governments, which collect taxes from members of one set of
age groups [  –
g(a)] and make transfers to members of other age groups
[ g
 (a)]. These two sets of age groups may well overlap. Private transfers are
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(NPISHs). Net private transfers are given by  f(a)    f
 (a) –  f
–(a).
Public transfer inﬂows can be in the form of cash or in-kind. Cash public
transfer inﬂows are typically targeted and the associated inﬂows often vary
substantially with age. Welfare programs provide cash beneﬁts to children
and/or mothers. Unemployment beneﬁts target those in the working ages.
Pension beneﬁts target the elderly.
The age pattern of the outﬂows depends on the mechanisms by which the
programs are ﬁnanced—the age variation of the economic resource being
taxed and the age variation in the rate of taxation. The economic resource
being taxed depends on the incidence of the tax. Our approach is to follow
the methods employed in generational accounting (GA). With a few ex-
ceptions, GA assumes that the incidence of the tax falls on the entity that
pays the tax: payroll taxes are paid by workers, sales taxes by consumers,
property taxes by owners of property, and so forth (Auerbach and Kot-
likoﬀ 1999).
Private transfers largely consist of familial transfers. In virtually all so-
cieties, familial transfers are the dominant reallocation system through
which children are supported. As previously noted, neither capital- nor
property-based reallocations can be used to transfer resources in a down-
ward direction; that is, from the working ages to the childhood ages. Credit
plays a limited role for legal and institutional reasons. A few instances can
be identiﬁed where supporting children is a community or a public re-
sponsibility rather than a familial responsibility. Examples include some
African societies, the kibbutz in Israel, and limited experiments with the
collectivization of child care in some Communist economies. But even
where familial systems are primarily responsible for supporting children,
public transfers can be substantial. In many countries, the public sector
plays an important role in education. Also, many low-fertility countries
have adopted or are considering policies that increase the importance of
the public reallocation system vis-à-vis the familial system. These include
family allowances, subsidization of child care, tax beneﬁts, and so forth.
Children are also the beneﬁciaries of a broad set of public goods and ser-
vices that accrue to members of society at large.
Two forms of private transfers are distinguished in table 3.2 and the re-
sults discussed in the following. Inter vivos transfers consist of interhouse-
hold transfer (transfers between two existing households) and intrahouse-
hold transfers (transfers between individuals who belong to the same
household). The second form, bequests, consists of transfers associated
with the “death” of a household that may arise in several ways: the death
of the household head, the merger of two preexisting households, or the in-
tergenerational transition in headship as captured by a change in the indi-
vidual designated as the household head.
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Measuring interhousehold transfers is a relatively straightforward em-
pirical task that relies directly on survey data from income and expenditure
surveys or more specialized surveys of transfer behavior. Income and ex-
penditure surveys typically report both gifts received and made, so that
outﬂows and inﬂows can be calculated directly from the survey.
The most serious technical diﬃculty that arises is that transfers received
may be seriously underreported in household surveys. Often, reported
transfers made exceed reported transfers received. Part of the diﬀerence
can be explained by remittances to and from abroad, but it is generally be-
lieved that diﬀerences due to reporting error can be substantial. According
to one recent estimate, U.S. households reported giving $64 billion in 1997.
They reported receiving $47 billion annually, on average, between 1993 and
mid-1998 (Brown and Weisbenner 2002). In Taiwan the diﬀerences are
smaller. In 1998, transfers received were NT$1.9 billion, while transfers
given were NT$ 2.1 billion.
In a closed economy, aggregate outﬂows and inﬂows will be equal and
should be adjusted to ensure aggregate consistency. In an open economy,
outﬂows and inﬂows will no longer be equal. A further technical diﬃculty
arises if inﬂows include capital transfers that arise from bequests. Transfers
made by households that no longer exist at the time of the survey are not
captured as outﬂows but may be captured as inﬂows.
NT Flow Accounts are estimated based on the assumption that all in-
terhousehold transfers are between heads of households. With few excep-
tions, income and expenditure surveys do not provide information about
transfers to and from individuals within households. One exception is the
Taiwan FIES, which reports interhousehold transfer inﬂows to individuals
and to the collective household. In 1998, 65.6 percent of the inﬂows were
reported as to the household; 20.5 percent to the head, 1.0 percent to the
spouse of the head, and only 1.9 percent to other household members.9
Intrahousehold Familial Transfers
Household members who consume more than their disposable income
receive intrahousehold transfers from those who consume less than their
disposable income. Disposable income is deﬁned as labor income plus net
public cash transfers (cash inﬂows less taxes) plus net interhousehold
transfers. In some households, the disposable income of all members com-
bined exceeds the total consumption of all members combined. The sur-
plus is transferred to the household head and saved. In other households,
total disposable income is less than total consumption, and they support
some part of their consumption using asset income or, if necessary, by dis-
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9. Calculated by authors.saving. This portion of the deﬁcit is ﬁnanced by additional intrahousehold
transfers from the household head to household members.
The consumption of durables, including the services from owner-
occupied housing, are treated in a distinct fashion because, by assumption,
the household head owns all household assets and thus all income gener-
ated by those assets ﬂows to the head. The consumption of durables by any
nonhead household member is ﬁnanced by an intrahousehold transfer
from the head to the member equal to the value of durable consumption.
Intrahousehold transfers to support current consumption (nondurable
consumption) are ﬁnanced by imposing a household-speciﬁc ﬂat-rate tax
on each member’s surplus income. Within the household, each member
is taxed at the same rate. The tax rate does not vary by age. Moreover,
we assume that the household-speciﬁc tax rate for any sector (education,
health, or other nondurable consumption) is identical for each household
member.
Intrahousehold transfers are computed at the micro-level and aggre-
gated to construct age proﬁles. To calculate the intrahousehold transfers
requires estimates for each individual of consumption, labor income, net
public cash transfers, and interhousehold transfers.
Bequests
Bequests capture all capital transfers that occur because of headship
transitions. If a household head dies, if two independent households
merge, or if the headship designation within an existing household shifts
from one member to another, a capital transfer is generated. The estimates
of bequests presented in table 3.2 are very preliminary and intended only
to suggest magnitudes.
The estimates were obtained in the following way. First, the rate of return
to assets was assumed to be independent of age. Thus, wealth by age has
the same age distribution as asset income by age. Second, the survival rate
of heads is assumed to be independent of wealth. If wealthy heads have a
higher survival rate—a likely possibility—the mean age of bequests would
be greater than those reported in table 3.2. Preliminary analysis suggests
that the covariance between wealth and survival in Taiwan is relatively
small, however. Third, we assumed that all capital transfers were to direct
descendants, assumed to be thirty years younger than the household head.
Thirty years is the mean generation length in Taiwan. If there is a parity
bias in bequests—that is, if older children receive a larger share of be-
quests, the inﬂow would be to older individuals, on average, than assumed
here. Given the low fertility and decline in parity bias in Taiwan, this is not
likely to have a substantial eﬀect. The use of a single age—thirty—rather
than a distribution, also has an eﬀect on the distribution of bequest in-
ﬂows. In the United States, unlike Taiwan, if a decedent was married, the
widower/widow is assumed to inherit the estate. Otherwise, the estate is in-
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average age shape of U.S. fertility over the last forty years. Future eﬀorts
will improve these estimates, and they are not emphasized here.
3.2.3 Estimation and Data Sources
National Transfer Flow Accounts are estimated relying on a variety of
sources of information. National Income and Product Accounts are used
to construct aggregate controls on public and private consumption, labor
income (compensation of employees plus a portion of household entre-
preneurial income), saving, asset income, public and private transfers, and
its components.
Aggregates are allocated across age groups, relying on a variety of data
sources, with extensive use made of administrative records and nationally
representative income and expenditure surveys. For Taiwan, we make ex-
tensive use of the 1998 Family Income and Expenditure Survey of Taiwan
(DGBAS various). For the United States, we make extensive use of the
Current Population Survey (1998, 1999, and 2000), the Consumer Expen-
diture Survey (1998, 1999, 2000), the Survey of Consumer Finances (1998
and 2001), and the U.S. National Health Accounts (1999). More informa-
tion about data sources and methods is available on www.ntaccounts.org.
3.2.4 Preliminary Results
The results presented in the remainder of the paper are snapshots—Na-
tional Transfer Accounts for a single year in Taiwan (1998) and the United
States (2000). The full value of the accounts will be realized only when we
have constructed estimates for many years. That work is underway, but the
estimates will not be available for some time. In the absence of these more
extensive data, we cannot, for example, track cohorts over time. The in-
ability to do so limits the extent to which we can explain the cross-sectional
patterns that we observe. In particular, we often can only speculate about
the extent to which the results reﬂect distinctive features of the years for
which the accounts were constructed, possibly substantial cohort eﬀects,
or the eﬀects of age. Before discussing the results, it is worthwhile to point
out some of the key features of Taiwan and the United States that may bear
on the results.
First, the ﬁscal crisis began to strike East Asia beginning in 1997, and
Taiwan’s economic growth was atypically slow in 1998. The crisis in Tai-
wan was much less severe than in many other East Asian countries, how-
ever. The year 2000 was an interesting year in the United States; the stock
market peaked in 2000, and the economy began to slow after an extended
period of strong economic growth.
Second, the current demographic situation in Taiwan and the United
States is similar in important respects. The total fertility rate is much lower
in Taiwan than in the United States. Life expectancy is about one and 
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ulation is younger, with 8.6 percent of its population aged sixty-ﬁve or
older in 2000 as compared with 12.4 percent in the United States. Both
countries experienced very substantial demographic change during the
post-World War II era. The total fertility rate (TFR) was much higher and
life expectancy at birth was much lower in Taiwan than in the United States
in the 1950s, but changed very rapidly. The United States experienced its
baby boom from 1946 to 1964. These experiences may bear in important
ways on the behavior of those who are now in their sixties and seven-
ties. Migration patterns are also diﬀerent between the two countries. The
United States, of course, has had relatively high rates of net immigration
during recent decades. Taiwan has not, but it did experience a huge inﬂux
of young adults—heavily male—from the Chinese mainland in 1949 to
1950.
Third, the economies of Taiwan and the United States are very diﬀerent.
Taiwan is a middle-income country with a per capita GDP of a little less
than $12,600 in 2001. In the United States, per capita GDP was $35,700 in
2001. But in 1960, real GNP per capita was only $1,000 in Taiwan (in 2001
prices) as compared with over $14,000 in the United States. Between 1960
and 2001, Taiwan’s real rate of growth of per capita GNP exceeded 6 per-
cent per annum! This implies extraordinary diﬀerences between the life-
time earnings of successive generations. Given a mean generation length of
thirty years and an annual growth rate of 6 percent, per capita income in-
creases by six-fold each generation. In contrast, real per capita GNP in the
United States grew at an annual rate of 2.2 percent between 1960 and 2001,
yielding roughly a doubling of per capita income per generation.
The Lifecycle Deﬁcit
The individual lifecycles in Taiwan and the United States are broadly
similar, but with some important diﬀerences (Fig. 3.2). In both settings,
children and the elderly consume substantially more than they produce. In
Taiwan, young adults begin to produce as much as they consume at age
twenty-four; in the United States at age twenty-six. In Taiwan, adults no
longer produce as much as they consume at age ﬁfty-seven; in the United
States, at age ﬁfty-nine. The span of years during which there is a lifecycle
surplus is surprisingly short in both countries—thirty-three years both in
Taiwan and in the United States.
The shape of the production (labor income) age proﬁles for Taiwan and
the United States are strikingly similar until adults reach their early forties.
To facilitate comparison of the United States with Taiwan, the proﬁles in
ﬁg. 3.2have been scaled by dividing by the simple average of per capita pro-
duction from ages thirty to forty-nine. Both the level and slope of the age
proﬁles are sensitive to the particular scaling factor chosen. However, the
percentage change in labor income associated with an additional year of
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come grows somewhat faster in Taiwan, while between the early twenties
and early forties, labor income grows somewhat faster in the United States.
Between the mid-forties and late ﬁfties, however, the income proﬁles di-
verge by as much as 5 percent per single year of age. The gap between the
United States and Taiwan persists into the older ages. The diﬀerences in
per capita labor income reﬂect diﬀerences in labor force participation—a
particularly rapid drop in participation rates with age in Taiwan—due en-
tirely to diﬀerences in female participation rates.
There are important similarities in the consumption patterns at young
ages in Taiwan and the United States. Consumption by children, relative
to consumption by adults in their thirties and forties, is similar in Taiwan
and the United States. In both countries, consumption by young children
is substantially less than consumption by older children and prime-age
adults. In both settings, consumption by children increases in a large and
discrete fashion as children enter school. The subsequent decline is associ-
ated with the decline in spending on education as children depart high
school in the United States and college in Taiwan.
The diﬀerences in the consumption proﬁles for those in their thirties and
older are quite striking, however. In the United States, the consumption
proﬁle rises very steadily with age. In Taiwan, the consumption proﬁle is
relatively ﬂat, but declines gradually with age. The simple average of per
capita consumption by those sixty-ﬁve to ninety-plus was 134 percent in
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Fig. 3.2 Lifecycle of production and consumption, per capita, United States, 2000
and Taiwan, 1998the United States and 96 percent in Taiwan of per capita consumption of
those age twenty to sixty-four. A substantial part of the diﬀerence can be
attributed to the consumption of health (ﬁg. 3.3). If we consider just non-
health consumption, elderly and nonelderly adults in the United States had
virtually identical consumption, while Taiwan elderly had nonhealth con-
sumption equal to about 85 percent of the nonhealth consumption of
adults between the ages of twenty and sixty-four. Thus, even controlling for
health consumption, U.S. elderly were consuming at a much high rate rel-
ative to nonelderly adults than were the elderly in Taiwan.
The diﬀerences in consumption are most pronounced for the elderly, but
they are not conﬁned to them. In Taiwan, the average consumption by
those age ﬁfty to sixty-four was 95 percent of the average consumption of
those age twenty to forty-nine, while in the United States the ﬁgure was 124
percent.
Why health consumption increased so much more steeply with age in the
United States than in Taiwan and why nonhealth consumption declined
with age in Taiwan are interesting questions, about which we can only spec-
ulate at this point. One possibility is that the lower consumption among
older ages in Taiwan is a response to their lower relative current labor in-
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Fig. 3.3 Per capita consumption by age and components, United States, 2000 and
Taiwan, 1998come. Another possibility is that the lower consumption of the elderly is a
response to their relatively low lifetime labor income. Perhaps institutional
diﬀerences are playing a role, with U.S. consumption patterns reﬂecting
greater reliance on public transfer programs and Taiwan’s greater reliance
on familial transfer programs. Familial transfer programs internalize costs
of excess consumption to the family.
The per capita deﬁcits (ﬁg. 3.4) are closer than their constituent ele-
ments—consumption and labor income. Taiwan’s surplus is greater for
young working-age adults—those under the age of ﬁfty; the surplus values
are similar for adults in their ﬁfties and early sixties. The most striking
diﬀerence between the two series is the substantially larger lifecycle deﬁcit
for U.S. elderly. Given the age distribution of the population, the lifecycle
reallocation system of the United States shifts a larger share of resources
to older ages than does the Taiwan reallocation system. That the U.S. pop-
ulation is older than the Taiwan population only serves to reinforce this
feature of the U.S. reallocation system.
The Reallocation System
The broad features of the reallocation system are presented in ﬁgure 3.5
for Taiwan in 1998 and in ﬁgure 3.6 for the United States in 2000. Panel A
reports the aggregate ﬂows to and from each age group. Panel B reports the
per capita ﬂows. Four economic forms used to reallocate resources are dis-
tinguished: asset-based reallocations, public transfers, private transfers,
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Fig. 3.4 Lifecycle deﬁcits, Taiwan, 1998 and United States, 2000
Note: The lifecycle deﬁcit is expressed relative to the simple mean of average production for
those 30 to 49.A
B
Fig. 3.5 A, Components of age reallocations aggregate values, Taiwan, 1998; B,
Components of age reallocations per capita values, Taiwan, 1998A
B
Fig. 3.6 A, Components of age reallocations, aggregate values, United States,
2000; B, Components of age reallocations per capita values, United States, 2000and bequests. Negative values represent outﬂows and positive values rep-
resent inﬂows. The values are stacked in the ﬁgures. For example, teenagers
in Taiwan received net transfers of about $NT 100 billion, of which about
one-fourth was public and three-fourths was private. At many ages there
are simultaneously inﬂows from one system and outﬂows from another
system. In both the United States and Taiwan, asset-based reallocations
are producing inﬂows to most working ages while public and private trans-
fers are producing outﬂows at the same ages. The outﬂows less the inﬂows
equal the lifecycle deﬁcits for Taiwan and the United States.
The reallocation systems that support children are similar in Taiwan and
the United States. In both, transfers dominate the reallocation system for
children, with total transfers nearly equal to total reallocations. Familial
transfers are particularly important. Private, intrahousehold transfers ac-
counted for 74 percent of all transfers in Taiwan and 57 percent in the
United States.10 The importance of familial transfers should not come as
any great surprise. We know that asset-based reallocations are infrequently
used to support the consumption of children. Of asset-based reallocations,
only credit can be used to support consumption by children. Creditors
have limited recourse if children default on their debt, limiting the extent
to which children can borrow. Thus, transfers dominate the child reallo-
cation system in both Taiwan and the United States—and no doubt else-
where.
Public transfers to children are also quite substantial. In Taiwan, 24 per-
cent of all transfers were public transfers, as compared with 38 percent in
the United States. As can be seen in ﬁgure 3.3, a signiﬁcant portion of these
transfers is public education spending. Of roughly equal importance is
children’s pro rata share of pure public goods and other goods that cannot
be assigned to speciﬁc individuals.
In Taiwan and the United States, the old-age reallocation systems are
very diﬀerent than the child reallocation systems. The elderly rely both
on asset-based reallocations and transfers to generate inﬂows. The elderly
can, in principle, generate asset-based reallocation inﬂows in two ways:
ﬁrst, by earning asset income on their accumulated wealth and, second, by
dissaving or liquidating their assets. There are many ways in which this can
be accomplished. The elderly can sell oﬀ ﬁnancial assets or a family busi-
ness or farm, take out a reverse mortgage on a home, or sell their home and
rent or buy a less expensive residence.
For U.S. elderly, asset reallocations are very important, constituting 65.3
percent of life-cycle reallocations. Of this total, 65.1 percent of total real-
locations was net asset income and 0.2 percent was dissaving. At ﬁrst
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10. Dependent children do not receive interhousehold transfers in the accounting system,
by assumption.glance this seems to provide strong support for the life-cycle saving hy-
pothesis and runs contrary to previous empirical research—that U.S. el-
derly save. However, the saving reported here includes the dissaving that
occurs because the death of households generates downward transfers of
assets. For the cohort, this is dissaving but is not undertaken for life-cycle
purposes. If we conﬁne our attention to surviving households, about half
of reallocations were asset reallocations and half were transfers. Income on
assets amounted to 65.1 percent of reallocations as before, but 16.9 percent
of reallocations were saved and the remainder (48.2 percent) was devoted
to the life-cycle deﬁcit. Thus, our estimates imply that the elderly did save,
but they also relied heavily on the income generated by assets accumulated
during their working years. This provides support in a diﬀerent form for
the life-cycle hypothesis.
For Taiwan’s elderly, asset-based reallocations were also important but
less so than in the United States. Asset-based reallocations were 40.9 per-
cent of total reallocations; asset income amounted to 54.2 percent of total
reallocations, but 13.3 percent of that was saved. Given that bequests were
equal to 19.2 percent of total reallocations, total saving by survivors was
32.5 percent of total reallocations. Considering only surviving households,
asset-based reallocations were 21.7 percent of total reallocations (54.2 per-
cent in asset income less 32.5 percent that was saved). The surviving elderly
in Taiwan had less asset income and saved more than their U.S. counter-
parts. Asset reallocations were thus less important to surviving elderly
households in Taiwan than in the United States.
Transfers were important components of the reallocation systems for
the elderly in both countries but, again, a clear picture requires careful at-
tention to the role of bequests. In the United States, public transfers are
particularly important. If we ignore bequests, public transfers constituted
37.0 percent and private transfers 7.3 percent of total reallocations to the
elderly. Transfers are almost as important as asset-based reallocations, and
public transfers dominate. Private transfers to the elderly are small in the
United States. Note, however, that private transfers are greater than one
would think, based solely on interhousehold transfers, even in the United
States. Once bequests are taken into account, however, we see that the di-
rection of the private transfer is from the old to the young rather than the
reverse. Bequests were more than twice private transfers to the elderly in
2000.
In Taiwan, public transfers were less important than in the United States,
but private transfers far more than compensated for the lower level of
public transfers. Public transfers were 31.0 percent of total reallocations
for the elderly; private inter vivos transfers were 47.6 percent of life-cycle
reallocations. Combined transfers excluding bequests were over three-
fourths of life-cycle reallocations, with private transfers playing a particu-
larly important role. Unlike the United States, private transfers are still in
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taking bequests into consideration.
In important respects the reallocations for those with life-cycle surpluses
are just the counterpart for the reallocations for children and elderly, as
just described. This is true by deﬁnition for transfers, because inﬂows and
outﬂows must match, ignoring the relatively modest amounts of interna-
tional ﬂows. The large public transfer inﬂows to U.S. elderly must be
matched by large public transfer outﬂows from those in the working ages.
Likewise, the large private transfer inﬂows to Taiwan elderly must be
matched by large private transfer outﬂows from those in the working ages.
Exactly which working ages experience the public sector outﬂows depends
on the tax systems, their incidence, and the age distribution of the eco-
nomic resources being taxed. Exactly which working ages experience the
private sector outﬂows depends to a great extent on the coresidence pat-
terns that, in turn, govern intrahousehold transfers.
In Taiwan, the burden of ﬁnancing public transfers falls a little more
heavily on those age thirty to forty-nine, for whom net public transfers are
–13.5 percent of labor income, than on those age ﬁfty to sixty-four, for
whom net public transfers are –11.4 percent of labor income. In the United
States, the opposite is true: the burden falls slightly more heavily on those
age ﬁfty to sixty-four, for whom net public transfers are –22.7 percent of
labor income, than on those age thirty to forty-nine, for whom net public
transfers are –21.6 percent of labor income. Private transfers in Taiwan,
however, are a much heavier burden for those age thirty to forty-nine. Their
net private transfers are –40.7 percent of their labor income. Inter vivos
transfers are –43.3 percent of labor income. Net private transfers for those
age ﬁfty to sixty-four are –31.4 percent of their labor income and inter
vivos transfers are only –19.2 percent of labor income. It is tempting to ar-
gue that those below ﬁfty are heavily burdened because they are paying for
the high consumption of children. The net transfers from those age 30 to
49 are more or less equal in absolute value to the net transfers to those un-
der age thirty. The generation length in Taiwan is about thirty years, how-
ever, and it is likely that children are being supported by those over age
ﬁfty, and the elderly are being supported by those under age ﬁfty. In the
United States, net private transfers are smaller than in Taiwan, at –24.8
percent of labor income for those age thirty to forty-nine and –17.0 percent
for those age ﬁfty to sixty-four.
Unlike transfers, asset-based reallocations need not balance.11 In both
Taiwan and the United States, total asset income substantially exceeded
total saving. As can be seen in ﬁgs. 3.5 and 3.6, asset-based reallocations
are positive at most adult ages, not just at old age. In Taiwan, we see some
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11. In golden rule steady-state growth, all asset income is saved and total net asset-based
reallocations are equal to zero.negative asset-based reallocations at young adult ages, but these are small.
We see even less negative asset-based reallocations for the United States.
This is a puzzling pattern, and not what we would expect to see if work-
ers are accumulating pension assets. Suppose workers contributed a ﬁxed
percentage of their income to a pension fund during their working years,
and any interest generated by the fund was allowed to accumulate within
the fund—a normal practice. Saving by the workers would exceed interest
income by the portion of labor income that was contributed to the fund
each year. Asset-based reallocations would be negative during the working
years and would turn positive only after retirement. Even under very gen-
eral conditions, as cohorts begin to accumulate wealth, saving must exceed
asset income. Judging from the substantial asset income of older cohorts,
it is clear that they enter old age with a substantial amount of wealth. The
key question is “Why is saving so much less than asset income among work-
ing adults?”
First, these are cross-sectional data, not longitudinal data. There may be
particular features of the years in question—1998 in Taiwan and 2000 in
the United States—that led to high consumption and low saving during the
working ages. The ﬁnancial crisis hit East Asia beginning in 1997. Taiwan
was inﬂuenced less than many other East Asian countries, but economic
growth did slow in 1998. The United States experienced an enormous 
run-up in the stock market, which peaked in 2000. Housing prices also
increased very substantially in the United States. Perhaps working-age
Americans responded to the signiﬁcant increases in their real wealth by in-
creasing their consumption and reducing their saving.12
Second, the cross-sectional patterns may reﬂect longer-run trends. In
Taiwan, saving rates declined substantially between the late 1980s and the
late 1990s. The United States has experienced a long-run secular decline in
saving rates over the last three to four decades. It may be that in both coun-
tries, asset-based reallocations are becoming less important than they were
in the past. Hence, we observe relatively little saving at young ages, but rel-
atively large, asset-based reallocation inﬂows at older ages.
A third point to consider is that the asset-based age reallocations are
serving a life-cycle purpose other than the accumulation of pension wealth
as envisioned in the standard life-cycle saving model. We think it is plausi-
bly the case in Taiwan, where asset-based reallocation inﬂows are substan-
tial for those in their forties and early ﬁfties. At these ages, people in Tai-
wan are doubly burdened by dependent children and dependent elderly.
This is reﬂected in the very substantial inter vivos transfer outﬂows at these
ages. In a sense, life cycle saving is indirectly ﬁnancing the consumption of
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12. Net saving rates increased during the 1990s in the United States, but whether this is true
at all ages is unknown.the elderly by ﬁnancing transfers from middle-aged adults to their elderly
parents.
A ﬁnal point is that the asset-based reallocation pattern will vary, de-
pending on the importance of bequests and behavior regarding bequests.
Sources of Support
Sources of income are a standard and useful descriptive measure in re-
ports on the economics of aging. The NTA system yields a more complete
measure of the sources of support for the dependent populations by in-
cluding familial, intrahousehold transfers, and dissaving. In ﬁgs. 3.7 and
3.8 we compare the sources of support; that is, the methods by which con-
sumption was ﬁnanced, in Taiwan and the United States.
The methods by which the consumption of dependent children—de-
ﬁned as those under the age of twenty—are ﬁnanced are very similar in
Taiwan and the United States. In both countries, earnings by children are
relatively unimportant. Virtually all consumption is ﬁnanced by trans-
fers. Private transfers dominate, totaling 57 percent of consumption in the
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Fig. 3.7 Finance of consumption, young dependents age 0 to 19United States and 72 percent of consumption in Taiwan. The remainder
consists of public transfers.
The ﬁnance of consumption by the elderly is very diﬀerent in Taiwan and
the United States. Work plays a similar role in both—contributing about
15 percent of consumption in both the United States and Taiwan. Asset-
based reallocations and public transfers are more important in the United
States. Private, familial transfers are more important in Taiwan. The
greater importance of public transfers in the United States and private
transfers in Taiwan are consistent with what relatively casual observers
might expect. The greater importance of asset-based reallocations in the
United States may come as a surprise—perhaps to many. Saving rates are
not as high in Taiwan as in other East Asian countries. Moreover, the cur-
rent consumption by the elderly in Taiwan is very high relative to lifetime
earnings. In an economy characterized by such rapid economic growth, the
relatively ﬂat consumption proﬁle shown in ﬁg. 3.1 would almost certainly
be possible only if the reallocation system relied more on transfers and less
on assets.
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Fig. 3.8 Finance of consumption, persons 65 or older3.3 Conclusions
The reallocation of resources across age groups is an important feature
of any economy, yet it goes largely unmeasured at the aggregate level. The
objective of the research described here is to rectify that situation. By do-
ing so we should increase our understanding of generational diﬀerences in
the command over resources, the institutional mechanisms by which re-
sources are redistributed across generations, and how population aging is
likely to inﬂuence economic performance.
The research reported here, however, is in an early stage. The estimates
are preliminary and many of the methodologies are still being reﬁned.
Moreover, there are a number of diﬃcult issues that cannot be addressed
in an entirely satisfactory way, given the data and analytic techniques that
are currently available. Nonetheless, we believe that the development of the
National Transfer Account system will prove useful in the same way that
National Income and Product Accounts are useful, despite their ﬂaws. The
value will be enhanced, in particular, as estimates for additional years al-
low us to follow cohorts over their life cycles.
The results reported here provide information about support systems
that has not been previously available. We provide detailed information
about the asset accumulation process and how it relates to variation in life
cycle needs. In both countries, asset income is important to those who are
currently retired, but dissaving is not. In Taiwan, asset income indirectly
supports the elderly by ﬁnancing transfers from middle-aged adults to
elderly parents. Somewhat surprisingly, the accumulation of assets by
working-age adults is modest in both countries. Why this is so and whether
it is a persistent or transitory feature is a question that cannot be answered
with a single year of data.
One of the most important objectives of this research is to quantify both
public and private transfers in a way that allows comparison and analysis.
We ﬁnd that private, familial transfers from adult children to their elderly
parents are very important in Taiwan—similar in magnitude to public sup-
port to the elderly in the United States. Familial transfers are almost en-
tirely intrahousehold transfers.
Public transfers are also important in Taiwan and, although not docu-
mented here, known to be growing. Further analysis will hopefully shed
light on whether the growth of public transfers has served to crowd out
private transfers or whether the elderly have gained in terms of consump-
tion by being able to rely on a mix of assets, public programs, and familial
transfers.
One of the most striking diﬀerences between Taiwan and the United
States is the age pattern of consumption. In Taiwan, consumption appears
to vary little by age. In the United States, however, consumption by the el-
derly is very high. A large portion of the extra consumption—but by no
Population Aging and Intergenerational Transfers 119means all—is due to high consumption of health care goods and services.
This will clearly have important implications for how population aging will
inﬂuence the economies of Taiwan and the United States.
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Comment Andrew Samwick
This is a very interesting chapter that seeks to evaluate a methodology
for apportioning the traditional National Income and Product Account
(NIPA) aggregates to persons by age. This methodology allows us to
better understand how demographic trends and ﬁscal policy interact to
change lifecycle consumption and income proﬁles. It expands the usual
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